Vulnerability Prevention

Holistic Software Security

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Can we prevent vulnerabilities?

● Prevent => Making sure that a program does not have vulnerabilities.

● Why does a program has vulnerabilities?

How do we write programs?

I want to write code to do X:

1. Think about "How to do X" -> Algorithm.

2. Code <-> Test.

Development mindset => Will the code **do "X"**?

Security mindset => I want the code **NOT to do Y**.

Possible Y's:

- Buffer overflow.
- Out-of-bounds access.
- etc.

Bridging the gap!

- Train developers to have security mindset:
	- Secure coding training.

- Enable developers to write code that "cannot" have vulnerabilities:
	- Provide Memory safe/Type safe languages:
		- Java, Python, C#, etc.

Memory Safety

- Spatial memory safety: Ensuring all memory dereferences are within the objects allocated space.
	- Out of bounds access, buffer overflow, underflow, etc.
	- **○ arr[i]**

- Temporal memory safety: Ensuring that memory dereferences are valid at the time of access.
	- Use-after-free, double free, etc.
	- **○ free(p); *p = 0;**

Type Safety

- Objects are well-typed and conversion between types is well-defined:
	- Ex: In Java, type conversion is allowed only with in subtypes.

- Is Python type safe?
- Is Java type safe?
- Is C++ type safe?

How is safety implemented?

- Runtime checking:
	- Language runtime: Java JRE.
	- Memory accesses are checked for violations.
	- Castings are also checked at time.

Safety is not free!

Performance: Time and Space.

High-performant safe languages

- Rust/Go:
	- Similar to C/C++, faster than Java, Python, etc.

● Lets always use Rust/Go!

What is the catch?

What about legacy code?

Can we ask all developers to convert their code to safe languages?

Retrofitting Techniques

- Retrofit safety to unsafe languages:
	- Modify language semantics so that certain safety properties can be achieved.

- Performance overhead?
	- Space and Time.

- Automated or manual?
	- Does developer has to make changes to the existing code?

Retrofitting Techniques: Principles

- Spatial memory safety (SMS):
	- An efficient way to track bounds (start and end) of the object being referenced.

- Temporal memory safety (TMS):
	- An efficient way to track lifetime of objects.

SoftBound: SMS

For each pointer variable (p) : Add two variables to track bounds (start : p_base) and end: p_bound).

Check each pointer dereference to be with in bounds.

SoftBound: Tracking Pointers

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int** ptr;

int* new_ptr; $(*ptr) = newptr;$

SoftBound: Tracking Pointers

int** ptr; int* new_ptr; $(*ptr) = new_prr;$

int** ptr; int* new_ptr; $(*ptr) = new_prr;$ table_lookup(ptr)->base = newptr_base; table $lookup(ptr)$ ->bound = newptr bound;

 $newptr = *ptr;$

 $newptr = *ptr;$ newptr base = table $lookup(ptr)$ ->base; newptr bound = table $lookup(ptr)$ ->bound;

SoftBound: Performance

SafeCode: SMS

- Use splay trees to store the bounds information of pointers:
	- **Temporal locality**: Recently accessed object will be accessed again.

- Splay trees favors temporal locality:
	- Stack behaving tree: Recently inserted object will be fast to access.

SafeCode: Novelty

● Use pool allocation: Objects size fall into one of the predefined sizes. E.g., 16, 32, 64, etc.

- Split the global splay tree into multiple small splay trees:
	- One for each size.

● Given a pointer => Find its pool and check for the bounds in the splay tree of the corresponding pool.

Low Fat Pointers: SMS

We can smartly allocate and know the base and bounds from the pointer itself.

Each region will only store objects of specific size. E.g., 0x800000000-0xfffffffff for objects of size < 16 bytes

Low Fat Pointers

p = malloc(10); // p: 0x8997f2820

 $q = p + 5$; // $q = 0 \times 8997f2825$

char get(char *q, int i) { return q[i]; }

What is base(q) and size(q)?

 $base(q) =$

 $size(q) =$

What is base(q) and size(q)?

base(q) = **0x8997f2820**

size(q) = **16**

Since q is within the range (0x800000000.0xffffffffff), we know that the allocation size of the object pointed to by q is 16 bytes.

Base address should be: q - (q mod 16) = 0x8997f2820.

Handling pointer arithmetic

```
int list_length (Node *list)
\mathbf{1}\mathbf{f}\overline{2}int len = 0;
\overline{3}void *list\_base = base(list);\overline{4}size_t list_size = size(list);
5
         while (list != NULL)6
         \mathbf{f}7\phantom{.0}len++:
\boldsymbol{8}Node **next = &list -next;
9
              void *next\_base = list\_base;10
              size_t next_size = list_size;
11if (is00B(next, next_base, next_size))
12error()13
              list = *next;14list\_base = base(list);15
              list_size = size(list);16
17
         return len;
18
19
   \mathbf{F}
```
Overhead

● 56% for reads+writes

● 13% for writes-only

DANGNULL: TMS

- Handles temporal memory safety:
	- Should keep track of object life times.

- Keep tracks of heap objects in a red-black tree (shadowObjTree).
	- Each object has in-bound and out-bound pointers.
	- In-bound: Pointers that are pointing to the current object.
	- Out-bound: Objects to which the current object points to.

DANGNULL

DANGNULL: Instrumentation

 $doc->child->getalign();$

DANGNULL: Helper functions

def allocObj(size): $ptr = real_alloc(size)$ $shadowObj = createShadowObj(ptr, size)$ shadowObjTree.insert(shadowObj) return ptr

 $# NOTE$, lhs \lt - rhs def trace(lhs. rhs): $lhsShadowObj = shadowObjTree.find(1hs)$ r hsShadowObj = shadowObjTree.find(rhs)

Check if lhs and rhs are eligible targets.

if lhsShadowObj and rhsShadowObj: removeOldShadowPtr(lhs, rhs) $ptr = createShadowPtr(lhs, rhs)$ lhsShadowObj.insertOutboundPtr(ptr) rhsShadowObj.insertInboundPtr(ptr) return

 $def freeObj(ntr):$ $shadowObj = shadowObjTree.find(btr)$

- for ptr in shadowObj.getInboundPtrs(): $srcShadowObj = shadowObjTree.find(ptr)$ srcShadowObj.removeOutboundPtr(ptr) if shadowObj.base \leq ptr \leq shadowObj.end: $*$ ptr = NULLIFY VALUE
- for ptr in shadowObj.getOutboundPtrs(): $dstShadowObj = shadowObjTree.find(ptr)$ dstShadowObj.removeInboundPtr(ptr)

shadowObiTree.remove(shadowObi)

return real_free(ptr)

DANGNULL: Performance

Cost of automation

● High performance penalty.

- Not backward compatible:
	- E.g., regular pointers cannot co-exist with low fat pointers.

● Maintenance overhead: Should have these features in the latest compilers.