



C to Checked C by 3C

Aravind Machiry

John Kastner , Matt McCutchen , Aaron Eline ,
Kyle Headley , Michael Hicks




Elmore Family School of Electrical
and Computer Engineering



(work done prior to
starting at Amazon)

Memory Safety is a Problem (Still!?)

Vulnerabilities in Embedded Systems (RTOSes) - 68% are spatial violations.



OpenSSL: CVE-2022-3602 and CVE-2022-3786 (Heap buffer overwrites)

```
diff --git a/crypto/punycode.c b/crypto/punycode.c
```

```
index
```

```
385b4b1df46a385312c3028c77d17a822200cc70..5e211af6d9  
100644 (file)
```

```
--- a/crypto/punycode.c
```

```
+++ b/crypto/punycode.c
```

```
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int openssl_punycode_decode(const c
```

```
    n = n + i / (written_out + 1);
```

```
    i %= (written_out + 1);
```

```
-    if (written_out > max_out)
```

```
+    if (written_out >= max_out)
```

```
    return 0;
```

```
    memmove(pDecoded + i + 1, pDecoded + i,
```


Heap buffer overread in UEFI driver

Spatial Bugs can be hard to spot.

```
1  typedef struct {
2      UINT8 Len;
3      UINT8 Type;
4  } USB_DESC_HEAD;
5
6  void *UsbCreateDesc(UINT8 *Buf, UINTN Len, UINT8 Type){
7      UINTN Offset = 0;
8      USB_DESC_HEAD* Head = (USB_DESC_HEAD*)Buf;
9      while (!Offset < Len) && Head->Type != Type) {
10         Offset += Head->Len;
11         Head = (USB_DESC_HEAD*)(Buf + Offset);
12     }
13     DoSomethingUseful(Head);
14 }
```

Existing Solutions v/s Checked C

- Checked C
 - Safe-dialect of C.
 - Very Low memory and performance overhead.
 - Fast and backward compatible.



Checked C Pointer Types

- `_Ptr<T>`
 - Pointer to a singleton object of type T
- `_Array_ptr<T>`
 - Pointer to an array of type T
- `_Nt_array_ptr<T>`
 - Pointer to a null-terminated (ends with ‘\0’) array of type T

Safety Guarantees:

Pointers will be checked for safe usage (mostly) at compile time.

May insert run-time bounds checks (**but no extra metadata**)

_Ptr<T>

Points to a single memory object of type T - no pointer arithmetic or subscript operator (e.g., x[0]) allowed.

```
struct Data {  
    int val;  
    long lval;  
    ...  
};  
  
_Ptr<struct Data> p = malloc(sizeof(struct Data));  
...  
printf("val = %d\n", p->val);  
...  
p++;
```

_Ptr<T>

Points to a single memory object of type T - no pointer arithmetic or subscript operator (e.g., x[0]) allowed.

```
struct Data {  
    int val;  
    long lval;  
    ...  
};
```

```
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...  
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Compiler ensures through runtime checks that p is not NULL

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    int val;  
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    ...  
};
```

```
_Ptr<struct Data> p = malloc(sizeof(struct Data));  
...  
printf("val = %d\n", p->val);  
...  
p++;
```

Compiler ensures through runtime checks that p is not NULL

error: arithmetic on _Ptr type.

_Array_ptr<T>

Points to an array of elements of type T — *permits pointer arithmetic* and subscripting.

- ⦿ Bounds declared by programmers are checked at runtime when not provable at compile time.

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```
_Array_ptr<int> p = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int i = p[5];
```

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Points to an array of elements of type T — *permits pointer arithmetic* and subscripting.

- ⦿ Bounds declared by programmers are checked at runtime when not provable at compile time.

```
_Array_ptr<int> p = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int i = p[5]; —————> error: expression has unknown bounds.
```

```
    = p[5];  
      ^~~~~
```

Bounds declaration for `_Array_ptr<T>`

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(bounds_expr) = ...;
```

```
const unsigned int BUF_LEN=30;  
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);  
int i = p[5];
```

Bounds declaration for `_Array_ptr<T>`

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_Array_ptr<int> p : count(bounds_expr) = ...;
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```
const unsigned int BUF_LEN=30;  
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int i = p[5]; ————> No dynamic checks inserted as BUF_LEN > 5
```

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```
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_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int i = p[5]; → No dynamic checks inserted as BUF_LEN > 5
```


```
int j = p[30]; → error: out-of-bounds access.  
    = p[30];  
        ^
```


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```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(bounds_expr) = ...;
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```
const unsigned int BUF_LEN=30;  
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int i = p[5];  No dynamic checks inserted as BUF_LEN > 5
```

```
int j = p[30];  error: out-of-bounds access.  
    = p[30];
```

```
int k = p[var];  NULL ptr and bounds check inserted if var < BUF_LEN is not provable.
```


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```
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int i = p[5]; → No dynamic checks inserted as BUF_LEN > 5
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```
int j = p[30]; → error: out-of-bounds access.  
= p[30];
```

```
int k = p[var]; → NULL ptr and bounds check inserted if var < BUF_LEN is not provable.
```

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN / 2) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int l = p[15];
```

Bounds declaration for `_Array_ptr<T>`

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(bounds_expr) = ...;
```

```
const unsigned int BUF_LEN=30;  
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int i = p[5]; → No dynamic checks inserted as BUF_LEN > 5
```

```
int j = p[30]; → error: out-of-bounds access.  
                  = p[30];
```

```
int k = p[var]; → NULL ptr and bounds check inserted if var < BUF_LEN is not provable.
```

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN / 2) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int l = p[15]; → error: out-of-bounds access.  
                  = p[15]; Because p's bound are [p, p+15]
```

Bounds declaration for `_Array_ptr<T>`

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(bounds_expr) = ...;
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```
const unsigned int BUF_LEN=30;  
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int i = p[5];  $\longrightarrow$  No dynamic checks inserted as BUF_LEN > 5
```

```
int j = p[30];  $\longrightarrow$  error: out-of-bounds access.  
                  = p[30];
```

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int k = p[var];  $\longrightarrow$  NULL ptr and bounds check inserted if var < BUF_LEN is not provable.
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```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN / 2) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int l = p[15];  $\longrightarrow$  error: out-of-bounds access.  
                  = p[15]; Because p's bound are [p, p+15]
```

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN + 1) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

Bounds declaration for `_Array_ptr<T>`

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(bounds_expr) = ...;
```

```
const unsigned int BUF_LEN=30;  
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int i = p[5]; → No dynamic checks inserted as BUF_LEN > 5
```

```
int j = p[30]; → error: out-of-bounds access.  
= p[30];
```

```
int k = p[var]; → ^ → NULL ptr and bounds check inserted if var < BUF_LEN is not provable.
```

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN / 2) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
int l = p[15]; → error: out-of-bounds access.  
= p[15]; Because p's bound are [p, p+15]  
^
```

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : count(BUF_LEN + 1) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);  
error: declared bounds for 'p' are invalid after initialization.
```

Bounds declaration for `_Array_ptr<T>`

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : bounds(l_bound, u_bound) = ...;
```

```
#define BUF_LEN=30;  
_Array_ptr<int> p0 : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
_Array_ptr<int> p1 : bounds(p0, p0 + BUF_LEN/2) = p0;
```

Bounds declaration for `_Array_ptr<T>`

```
_Array_ptr<int> p : bounds(l_bound, u_bound) = ...;
```

```
#define BUF_LEN=30;  
_Array_ptr<int> p0 : count(BUF_LEN) = malloc(sizeof(int) * BUF_LEN);
```

```
_Array_ptr<int> p1 : bounds(p0, p0 + BUF_LEN/2) = p0;
```

```
int i = p1[15];
```

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```

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_Array_ptr<int> p1 : bounds(p0, p0 + BUF_LEN/2) = p0;
```

```
int i = p1[15]; → error: out-of-bounds access.  
           = p1[15];  
           ~~~~~
```

_Nt_array_ptr<T>

Points to a null-terminated array of type T (integral and pointer type)
— permits pointer arithmetic

```
_Nt_array_ptr<char> p0 : count(5) = "12345";
```


_Nt_array_ptr<T>

Points to a null-terminated array of type T (integral and pointer type)
— permits pointer arithmetic

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p0 : count(5) = "12345";` **OK. p0 is pointing to array of 6 chars (including NULL).**

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p = "12345";` **Equivalent to declaring Bounds of p as "p: bounds(p, p+1)"**

`char c = p[0];` **OK.**

`char c = p[1];` **error: out-of-bounds access.**

`= p[1];`
~~~~~  
^

```
if (*p == 'a') {  
    if *(p + 1) == 'b') {  
        if *(p + 3) == 'd') {
```

## \_Nt\_array\_ptr<T>

Points to a null-terminated array of type T (integral and pointer type)  
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`char c = p[0];` **OK.**

`char c = p[1];` **error: out-of-bounds access.**

`= p[1];`  
~~~~~  
^

`if (*p == 'a') {` **OK. P's bound has been widened to [p, p+2).**

`if (p + 1 == 'b') {`

`if (p + 3 == 'd') {`

_Nt_array_ptr<T>

Points to a null-terminated array of type T (integral and pointer type)
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`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p0 : count(5) = "12345";` OK. `p0` is pointing to array of 6 chars (including NULL).

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`char c = p[0];` OK.

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`= p[1];`
~~~~~  
^

`if (*p == 'a') {` OK. `P's bound has been widened to [p, p+2).`

`if (*(p + 1) == 'b') {` OK. `P's bound has been widened to [p, p+3).`

`if (*(p + 3) == 'd') {`

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`char c = p[0];` OK.

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`= p[1];`  
~~~~~  
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`if (*p == 'a') {` OK. P's bound has been widened to `[p, p+2)`.

`if (*(p + 1) == 'b') {` OK. P's bound has been widened to `[p, p+3)`.



`if (*(p + 3) == 'd') {` → error: out-of-bounds access.

Because, P's bound is `[p, p+3)`.

Other Checked C Features

- `i` type:
 - Interface types enabling passing checked or unchecked types.
- `checked / unchecked` scopes:
 - Enable disabling strict checks across code regions.
- `dynamic_bounds_cast`:
 - Force dynamic checks.
- `assume_bounds_cast`:
 - Force conversion from unchecked pointers to checked pointers.

Converting C to Checked C



Converting C to Checked C

Refactoring the FreeBSD Kernel with Checked C

Junhan Duan,* Yudi Yang,* Jie Zhou, and John Criswell
Department of Computer Science
University of Rochester

It took two **undergraduate students approximately three months** to refactor the system calls, the network packet (mbuf) utility routines, and parts of the IP and UDP processing code. Our experiments show that using Checked C incurred no performance or code size overheads. 😊

Index Terms—memory safety, safe C, FreeBSD

The Problem

- Conversion of C to Checked C requires quite a bit of effort.
 - 14% lines modified.
- Can we automate the conversion?
 - Rewrite code with Checked types.

Not all Pointers can be converted to Checked Types

Incompatible Casts:

```
m = (int *)0x7869000;
```

```
x = (char *)get_data(..);
```

These pointers cannot be converted and should remain as regular pointers (WILD).


Infeasibility of Automated Conversion

```
int resize_buf(char **buf, unsigned *sz) {
    char *newbuf = NULL;
    unsigned news = round_up(*sz, 64);
    newbuf = realloc(buf, news);
    *buf = newbuf;
    *sz = news;
    return newbuf != NULL;
}
```




```
typedef struct {
    array_ptr<char> buf : count(sz);
    unsigned sz;
} SIZEBUF;

int resize_buf(ptr<SIZEBUF> buf) _Checked {
    unsigned news = round_up(buf->sz, 64);
    array_ptr<char> newbuf : count(news) = NULL;
    newbuf = realloc<char>(buf->buf, news);
    buf->buf = newbuf;
    buf->sz = news;
    return newbuf != NULL;
}

// Refactor all callers of resize_buf to
// use the new caller. 
```

Our Approach: 3c



Infer Checked Types for Pointers

- **typ3c:** Infer Checked base types.
 - Ptr, Array_ptr (arr), Nt_array_ptr (ntarr)
- **boun3c:** Infer bounds association for arr and ntarr types.
 - count(..), byte_count(..), bounds(...)

typ3c: Infer Checked Base Types for Pointers

- Basic Idea: Type qualifier inference.

```
int *foo(int **p) {  
    int *r;  
    int *m;  
    ...  
    m = r;  
    ...  
    if (p[i])  
        ...  
    return r;  
}  
  
bar() {  
    int *x;  
    int **y;  
    ...  
    x = foo(y);  
    ...  
    x[i] = 0;  
}
```

Type qualifier inference

Step 1: Create **qualifier variables** for each pointer


```
int *foo(int **p) {  
    int *r;  
    int *m;  
    ...  
    m = r;  
    ...  
    if (p[i])  
        ...  
    return r;  
}  
  
bar() {  
    int *x;  
    int **y;  
    ...  
    x = foo(y);  
    ...  
    x[i] = 0;  
}
```

Type qualifier inference

Step 1: Create **qualifier variables** for each pointer

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
  int *r; r
  int *m; m
  ...
  m = r;
  ...
  if (p[i])
    ...
  return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
  int *x; x
  int **y; y_1 y_2
  ...
  x = foo(y);
  ...
  x[i] = 0;
}
```




Type qualifier inference

Step 2: Create **constraints** based on pointer usage.

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
  int *r;
  int *m;
  ...
  m = r;
  ...
  if (p[i])
    ...
  return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
  int *x;
  int **y;
  ...
  x = foo(y);
  ...
  x[i] = 0;
}
```



Type qualifier inference

Step 2: Create **constraints** based on pointer usage.

```
ret_f  
int *foo(int **p) {
```

```
    int *r; r
```

```
    int *m; m
```

```
    ...
```

```
    → m = r;
```

```
    ...
```

```
    if (p[i])
```

```
        ...
```

```
    return r;
```

```
bar() {
```

```
    int *x; x
```

```
    int **y; y_1 y_2
```

```
    ...
```


```
    x = foo(y);
```

```
    ...
```

```
    x[i] = 0;
```

```
}
```

The type of **r** should be subtype of **m**.




Type qualifier inference

Step 2: Create **constraints** based on pointer usage.

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
    int *r; r
    int *m; m
    ...
    m = r;
    ...
    if (p[i])
        ...
    return r;
}
```

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bar() {
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    ...
    x = foo(y);
    ...
    x[i] = 0;
}
```




Type qualifier inference

Step 3: Solve based on typing rules.

NTARR \subseteq **ARR** \subseteq **PTR**
Most Specific Type Most General Type

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
  int *r; r
  int *m; m
  ...
  m = r;
  ...
  if (p[i])
    ...
  return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
  int *x; x
  int **y; y_1 y_2
  ...
  x = foo(y);
  ...
  x[i] = 0;
}
```




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Step 3: Solve based on typing rules.

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ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
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  if (p[i])
    ...
  return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
  int *x; x
  int **y; y_1 y_2
  ...
  x = foo(y);
  ...
  x[i] = 0;
}
```



We want **the greatest solution -- most general type.**
i.e., $i \subseteq j$ will result in $Type(i) = Type(j)$


Type qualifier inference

Step 3: Solve based on typing rules.

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
  int *r; r
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  ...
  m = r;
  ...
  if (p[i])
    ...
  return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
  int *x; x
  int **y; y_1 y_2
  ...
  x = foo(y);
  ...
  x[i] = 0;
}
```

NTARR \subseteq **ARR** \subseteq **PTR**
Most Specific Type Most General Type



Greatest Solution:


ret_f, x, r, p_1, y_1 => **ARR**

m, y_2, p_2 => **PTR**

The Problem of Wildfire.

Regular Qualifier Inference will propagate WILDness unnecessarily across function boundaries.

```
int deref(int *y) { return *y; }
```

```
int bar(void) {  
 int *p = (int *)5;  
  deref(p);  
}
```

y will be **unnecessary made WILD** although **it is used safely** in deref

Handling unchecked (WILD) Pointers in typ3c


Localizing Wildness:

- ◎ A pointer is wild if its used unsafely within the corresponding function.
 - E.g.,
 - ◎ Parameter is WILD if used unsafely with in the function.
 - ◎ Return type is WILD if the function returns an unsafe type.

Isolation Across Function Boundaries Does Not Work!

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
    int *r; r
    int *m; m
    ...
    m = r;
    ...
    if (p[i])
        ...
    return r;
}
```


```
bar() {
    int *x; x
    int **y; y_1 y_2
    ...
    x = foo(y);
    ...
    x[i] = 0;
}
```



Isolation Across Function Boundaries Does Not Work!

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
    int *r; r
    int *m; m
    ...
    m = r;
    ...
    if (p[i])
        ...
    return r;
}
```


```
bar() {
    int *x; x
    int **y; y_1 y_2
    ...
    x = foo(y);
    ...
    x[i] = 0;
}
```



Isolation Across Function Boundaries Does Not Work!

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
    int *r; r
    int *m; m
    ...
    m = r;
    ...
    if (p[i])
        ...
    return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
    int *x; x
    int **y; y_1 y_2
    ...
    x = foo(y);
    ...
    x[i] = 0;
}
```



Actual:

x, p_1 => **ARR**
ret_f, r, m, y_1, y_2, p_2 => **PTR**

Expected:

ret_f, x, r, p_1, y_1 => **ARR**
m, y_2, p_2 => **PTR**

Conflicting Requirements!

- **Need to isolate function boundaries** to localize WILDness.
- **Should not isolate** to infer correct Checked types.


Our solution: Create two graphs (kind and ptype graph)

- kind graph: Isolate function boundaries.
 - Whether a pointer is checked or wild.
 - `chk` \subseteq `WILD`
- ptype graph: Regular qualifier inference.
 - ptr, arr, ntarr: `NTARR` \subseteq `ARR` \subseteq `PTR`
- Two nodes for pointer parameters and returns.
 - Internal (Inside the function).
 - External (For the callers).

kind graph


```
1: int *foo(int *x) {  
2: ...  
3: return x;  
4: }  
  
5: bar () {  
6: int *i, *j, *k;  
7: i = (int *)0xff86763;  
8: j = foo(i);  
9: k = i;  
10: j[0] = ...  
}
```

Kind graph



kind graph


```
1: int *foo(int *x) {  
2: ...  
3: return x;  
4: }  
  
5: bar () {  
6: int *i, *j, *k;  
7: i = (int *)0xff86763;  
8: j = foo(i);  
9: k = i;  
10: j[0] = ...  
}
```



- **Flow sensitive** only across function boundaries to avoid propagating wildness.
- **Flow insensitive** within the function.


kind graph

```
1: int *foo(int *x) {  
2: ...  
3: return x;  
4: }  
  
5: bar () {  
6: int *i, *j, *k;  
7: i = (int *)0xff86763;  
8: j = foo(i);  
9: k = i;  
10: j[0] = ...  
}
```



ptype graph



```
1: int *foo(int *x) {  
2: ...  
3: return x;  
4: }  
  
5: bar () {  
6: int *i, *j, *k;  
7: i = (int *)0xff86763;  
8: j = foo(i);  
9: k = i;  
10: j[0] = ...  
}
```




Merging Kind and Ptype solutions

- if $\text{kind}(p) = \text{chk}$ then checked type is $\text{ptype}(p)$.
- if $\text{kind}(p) = \text{WILD}$ then regular pointer.

Merging Kind and Ptype solutions



Final Solution



Infer Checked Types for Pointers

- **typ3c:** Infer Checked base types.
 - Ptr, Array_ptr (arr), Nt_array_ptr (ntarr)
- **boun3c:** Infer bounds association for arr and ntarr types.
 - count(..), byte_count(..), bounds(...)

Inferring Bounds for arr and ntarr pointers

- A variant of correlation analysis ¹.
- Associate each pointer (arr and ntarr) with a possible bound, and then propagate that association consistently.

Boun3c: Bounds Inference


- Keep track of pointer flows and variable flows:
 - pointer-flow-graph (pfg) => A version of ptype graph.
 - scalar-flow-graph (sfg) => Flow of scalar variables.

- Step 1: Figure out seed bounds:
 - Constant array. e.g., `int arr[10]`
 - Bounds => count (10)
 - Allocation using malloc. e.g., `p = (struct foo*) malloc(n*sizeof(struct foo));`
 - Bounds => count(n)
 - others.

Boun3c: Example


```
struct foo {  
    int *y; ARR  
    int l;  
};
```

```
void bar(int *x, int c) {  
    struct foo f = { x, c };  
    memset(x, 1, c);  
    x[0] = 0;  
}
```




Boun3c: Example

```
struct foo {  
    int *y; ARR  
    int l;  
};  
  
void bar(int ARR*x, int c) {  
    struct foo f = { x, c };  
    memset(x, 1, c);  
    x[0] = 0;  
}
```



Boun3c: Adding Seed Bounds

```
struct foo {  
    int *y; ARR  
    int l;  
};  
  
void bar(int *x, int c) {  
    struct foo f = { x, c };  
    memset(x, 1, c);  
    x[0] = 0;  
}
```




Boun3c: Bounds Inference

- Step 2: Propagate seed bounds context-sensitively to other pointers via pfg and sfg.
- Identify a common variable to which all incoming pointers' bounds propagate to and pick that variable as the bounds.
 - The variable should be in the same program scope as the pointer.


Boun3c: Propagate Bounds

```
struct foo {  
    int *y; ARR  
    int l;  
};  
  
void bar(int *x, int c) {  
    struct foo f = { x, c };  
    memset(x, 1, c);  
    x[0] = 0;  
}
```




Boun3c: Find Common Bounds

```
struct foo {  
    int *y; ARR  
    int l;  
};  
  
void bar(int *x, int c) {  
    struct foo f = { x, c };  
    memset(x, 1, c);  
    x[0] = 0;  
}
```



Boun3c: Rewrite and Add Bounds

```
struct foo {  
    array_ptr<int> y : byte_count(1);  
    int l;  
};  
  
void bar(array_ptr<int> x : byte_count(c),  
         int c) {  
    struct foo f = { x, c };  
    memset(x, 1, c);  
    x[0] = 0;  
}
```



Boun3c: Need for Context-Sensitivity

Confusion among structure fields.

```
struct obj {
    int *buf;
    unsigned idx;
    unsigned n;
}

func (..) {
    struct obj o1, o2;
    ...
    int *b = malloc(s*sizeof(int));
    o1.buf = b;
    o2.idx = s;
    o1.n = s;
}
```

```
struct obj {
    _Array_ptr<int> buf : count(idx);
    unsigned idx;
    unsigned n;
}
```

Boun3c: Context Sensitive Bounds Propagation

```
struct obj {  
    int *buf;  
    unsigned idx;  
    unsigned n;  
}  
  
func (..) {  
    struct obj o1, o2;  
    ...  
    int *b = malloc(s*sizeof(int));  
    o1.buf = b;  
    o2.idx = s;  
    o1.n = s;  
}
```

Context-Insensitive

```
struct obj {  
    _Array_ptr<int> buf : count(idx);  
    unsigned idx;  
    unsigned n;  
}
```

Context-Sensitive

```
struct obj {  
    _Array_ptr<int> buf : count(n);  
    unsigned idx;  
    unsigned n;  
}
```

Boun3c: Heuristics

- Consistent Upper Bound (CUB):

```
if (i<n)  
  p[i] = ..  
  ↓  
  count(n)
```

```
if (j>=k)  
  return -1;  
  p[j] = ..  
  ↓  
  count(k)
```

```
for (i=0; i<n; i++)  
  ...  
  arr[i] = ..;  
  ↓  
  count(n)
```


Boun3c: Heuristics

- Consistent Upper Bound (CUB):

```
if (i<n)  
  p[i] = ..  
  ↓  
  count(n)
```

```
if (j>=k)  
  return -1;  
  p[j] = ..  
  ↓  
  count(k)
```

```
for (i=0; i<n; i++)  
  ...  
  arr[i] = ..;  
  ↓  
  count(n)
```

- Name Prefix (NPr):

```
struct foo {  
  int *p;  
  unsigned p_len;  
}
```

→ count(p_len)

Boun3c: Heuristics

- Consistent Upper Bound (CUB):

```
if (i<n)  
  p[i] = ..  
  ↓  
  count(n)
```

```
if (j>=k)  
  return -1;  
  p[j] = ..  
  ↓  
  count(k)
```

```
for (i=0; i<n; i++)  
  ...  
  arr[i] = ..;  
  ↓  
  count(n)
```

- Name Prefix (NPr):

```
struct foo {  
  int *p;           → count(p_len)  
  unsigned p_len;  
}
```

- Next Parameter (NePa):

```
foo(int *arr, int n) → count(n)
```

Consistent Upper Bound (CUB): vsftpd Example


```
struct bin_to_ascii_ret
vsf_ascii_bin_to_ascii(
  const char *p_in,
  ...,
  unsigned int in_len,...) {
  →while (indexx < in_len) {
    char the_char = p_in[indexx];
    ...
  }
}
```



```
struct bin_to_ascii_ret
vsf_ascii_bin_to_ascii(
  (✓CUB)_Array_ptr<const char> p_in : count(in_len),
  ...,
  unsigned int in_len,...)
```

Interactivity

- For pointers which we are unable to convert:
 - Find the root cause and ask developer.



Interactivity



PROBLEMS 11 OUTPUT DEBUG CONSOLE TERMINAL

- bn.c 1
 - ✘ Pointer is wild because of: Passing argument to a function accepting var args. 3C_RealWild(12006) [Ln 117, Col 40]
bn.c[Ln 117, Col 6]: Passing argument to a function accepting var args.
- factorial.c tests 2
 - ✘ Pointer is wild because of: Passing argument to a function accepting var args. 3C_RealWild(6910) [Ln 65, Col 27]
randomized.c[Ln 14, Col 6]: Passing argument to a function accepting var args.
 - ✘ Pointer is wild because of: Passing argument to a function accepting var args. 3C_RealWild(6911) [Ln 69, Col 8]
factorial.c[Ln 74, Col 4]: Passing argument to a function accepting var args.
- golden.c tests 7
 - ✘ Pointer is wild because of: Passing argument to a function accepting var args. 3C_RealWild(7586) [Ln 196, Col 8]
golden.c[Ln 260, Col 8]: Passing argument to a function accepting var args.
 - ✘ Pointer is wild because of: Passing argument to a function accepting var args. 3C_RealWild(11844) [Ln 242, Col 57]
golden.c[Ln 242, Col 8]: Passing argument to a function accepting var args.
 - ✘ Pointer is wild because of: Passing argument to a function accepting var args. 3C_RealWild(11845) [Ln 242, Col 68]
golden.c[Ln 242, Col 8]: Passing argument to a function accepting var args.

Interactivity

```
💡 char op;  
char buf[8192];
```

Make this pointer non-WILD and apply the same observation to all the pointers.

Make ONLY this pointer non-WILD.

```
printf("\nRunning \"golden\" tests (parsed using from_int):\n\n");
```

Evaluation: Dataset

Programs suggested by Checked C team.

Program	Category	Size (SLOC)	Total Ptrs (TP)	Num Files (.c & .h)
vsftpd	FTP Server	14.7K	1,765	78
icecast	Media Server	18.2K	2,682	72
lua	Interpreter	19.4K	4,176	57
olden	Data-structure benchmark	10.2K	832	51
parson	Json parser	2.5K	686	3
ptrdist	Pointer-use benchmark	9.3K	920	39
zlib	Compression Library	21.3K	647	25
libtiff	Image Library	68.2K	3,478	43
libarchive	Archiving library	146.8K	10,269	149
thttpd	HTTP Server	7.6K	829	18
tinybignum	Integer Library	1.4K	129	7
Total		319.6K	26,413	542

Evaluation: Runtime

Time taken by automated conversion.

< 1 min

Program	Setup	Constraints Building	Constraints Solving	Bounds Inference	Rewriting	RC Comp	Total Time (s)
vsftpd	1.06 (35.7%)	0.45 (15.0%)	0.18 (6.1%)	0.23 (7.9%)	0.94 (31.8%)	0.07 (2.5%)	2.96
icecast	6.41 (46.9%)	1.2 (8.8%)	1.46 (10.7%)	1.05 (7.7%)	2.66 (19.5%)	0.63 (4.6%)	13.66
lua	2.19 (37.7%)	0.98 (16.9%)	0.38 (6.6%)	0.76 (13.0%)	1.25 (21.5%)	0.16 (2.8%)	5.81
olden	1.57 (63.4%)	0.23 (9.5%)	0.22 (9.1%)	0.1 (4.2%)	0.25 (10.1%)	0.06 (2.5%)	2.47
parson	0.21 (39.3%)	0.12 (23.6%)	0.03 (5.1%)	0.09 (17.2%)	0.06 (12.1%)	0.02 (4.6%)	0.53
ptrdist	1.12 (54.2%)	0.34 (16.3%)	0.19 (9.3%)	0.14 (6.6%)	0.21 (10.4%)	0.05 (2.5%)	2.06
zlib	0.87 (47.3%)	0.44 (23.9%)	0.11 (6.2%)	0.12 (6.5%)	0.21 (11.7%)	0.05 (2.5%)	1.83
libtiff	3.26 (38.1%)	1.58 (18.5%)	0.65 (7.6%)	0.75 (8.8%)	1.6 (18.7%)	0.55 (6.4%)	8.55
libarchive	14.63 (33.5%)	4.02 (9.2%)	2.91 (6.6%)	6.2 (14.2%)	13.94 (31.9%)	1.31 (3.0%)	43.74
thttpd	1.02 (42.2%)	0.51 (21.1%)	0.15 (6.1%)	0.36 (14.7%)	0.28 (11.6%)	0.06 (2.6%)	2.41
tinybignum	0.24 (52.6%)	0.07 (14.3%)	0.06 (12.9%)	0.02 (4.4%)	0.06 (12.2%)	0.01 (3.1%)	0.46
Total	32.57 (38.5%)	9.93 (11.8%)	6.34 (7.5%)	9.82 (11.6%)	21.47 (25.4%)	2.99 (3.5%)	84.49

Most time spent in compiler frontend

Evaluation: Typ3c

Program	Total Pointers (<i>TP</i>)	Checked pointers (<i>chk</i>) (% of <i>TP</i>)			Split of Identified Checked Pointer Types (% of <i>typ3c</i>)		
		typ3c	Without separating external and internal	Without isolating function boundaries	ptr	arr	ntarr
			typ3c ^f	CCured			
vsftpd	1,765	1,336 (75.7%)	1,226 (69.5%)	999 (56.6%)	1,199 (89.7%)	44 (3.3%)	93 (7.0%)
icecast	2,682	1,795 (66.9%)	1,670 (62.3%)	1,377 (51.3%)	1,429 (79.6%)	54 (3.0%)	312 (17.4%)
lua	4,176	2,781 (66.6%)	2,248 (53.8%)	1,771 (42.4%)	2,273 (81.7%)	254 (9.1%)	254 (9.1%)
olden	832	721 (86.7%)	709 (85.2%)	709 (85.2%)	571 (79.2%)	130 (18.0%)	20 (2.8%)
parson	686	507 (73.9%)	425 (62.0%)	291 (42.4%)	405 (79.9%)	9 (1.8%)	93 (18.3%)
ptrdist	920	684 (74.3%)	652 (70.9%)	623 (67.7%)	465 (68.0%)	181 (26.5%)	38 (5.6%)
zlib	647	385 (59.5%)	375 (58.0%)	337 (52.1%)	293 (76.1%)	86 (22.3%)	6 (1.6%)
libtiff	3,478	2,111 (60.7%)	2,016 (58.0%)	1,194 (34.3%)	1,694 (80.2%)	177 (8.4%)	240 (11.4%)
libarchive	10,269	6,842 (66.6%)	6,190 (60.3%)	4,924 (48.0%)	5,532 (80.9%)	896 (13.1%)	414 (6.1%)
thttpd	829	634 (76.5%)	616 (74.3%)	449 (54.2%)	341 (53.8%)	57 (9.0%)	236 (37.2%)
tinybignum	129	128 (99.2%)	117 (90.7%)	117 (90.7%)	110 (85.9%)	3 (2.3%)	15 (11.7%)
Total	26,413	17,924 (67.9%)	16,244 (61.5%)	12,791 (48.4%)	14,312 (79.8%)	1,891 (10.6%)	1,721 (9.6%)

Evaluation: Conversion Failures

Program	Total Pointers (TP)	Wild Pointers (<i>wild</i>) (% of TP)				Root Cause Top two Reasons (% of typ3c _w)
		typ3c _w	Total _d		U _r	
			Total _d	U _r		
vsftpd	1,765	429 (24.3%)	218 (12.4%)	9 (0.5%)	Invalid Cast (64.37%) Default void* type (16.9%)	
icecast	2,682	887 (33.1%)	337 (12.6%)	10 (0.4%)	Source code in non-writable file. (28.97%) Default void* type (24.2%)	
lua	4,176	1,395 (33.4%)	308 (7.4%)	8 (0.2%)	Union field encountered (76.1%) Invalid Cast (10.83%)	
olden	832	111 (13.3%)	13 (1.6%)	6 (0.7%)	Default void* type (56.8%) Assigning from 0 depth pointer to 1 depth pointer. (36.4%)	
parson	686	179 (26.1%)	99 (14.4%)	8 (1.2%)	Inferred conflicting types (62.27%) Invalid Cast (12.85%)	
ptrdist	920	236 (25.7%)	23 (2.5%)	15 (1.6%)	Unsafe call to allocator function. (45.63%) Unchecked pointer in parameter (35.58%)	
zlib	647	262 (40.5%)	48 (7.4%)	6 (0.9%)	Default void* type (51.06%) Invalid Cast (32.22%)	
libtiff	3,478	1,367 (39.3%)	337 (9.7%)	11 (0.3%)	Invalid Cast (52.02%) Union field encountered (13.84%)	
libarchive	10,269	3,427 (33.4%)	897 (8.7%)	10 (0.1%)	Invalid Cast (58.89%) Default void* type (18.75%)	
thttpd	829	195 (23.5%)	53 (6.4%)	7 (0.8%)	Default void* type (51.13%) Source code in non-writable file. (27.57%)	
tinybignum	129	1 (0.8%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.8%)	Source code in non-writable file. (100.0%)	
Total	26,413	8,489 (32.1%)	2,333 (8.8%)	91 (0.3%)		

Evaluation: Boun3c

char* usually do not
have explicit bounds
association

Program	Arrays (arr)					Null-terminated arrays (ntarr)			
	Require Bounds (RB_a)	Inferred Bounds				Require Bounds (RB_n)	Inferred Bounds		
		Total (% of RB_a)	Technique (% of Total)				Total (% of RB_n)	Technique (% of Total)	
Seeded	Flow		Heuristics	Seeded	Flow				
vsftpd	30	26 (86.7%)	15 (57.7%)	6 (23.1%)	5 (19.2%)	27	18 (66.7%)	17 (94.4%)	1 (5.6%)
icecast	29	20 (69.0%)	16 (80.0%)	4 (20.0%)	0 (0.0%)	159	59 (37.1%)	48 (81.4%)	11 (18.6%)
lua	146	79 (54.1%)	61 (77.2%)	18 (22.8%)	0 (0.0%)	99	28 (28.3%)	18 (64.3%)	10 (35.7%)
olden	91	87 (95.6%)	68 (78.2%)	19 (21.8%)	0 (0.0%)	0	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
parson	2	2 (100.0%)	2 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	33	22 (66.7%)	12 (54.5%)	10 (45.5%)
ptrdist	127	91 (71.7%)	53 (58.2%)	38 (41.8%)	0 (0.0%)	11	7 (63.6%)	4 (57.1%)	3 (42.9%)
zlib	52	50 (96.2%)	37 (74.0%)	12 (24.0%)	1 (2.0%)	1	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
libtiff	65	62 (95.4%)	42 (67.7%)	20 (32.3%)	0 (0.0%)	145	145 (100.0%)	144 (99.3%)	1 (0.7%)
libarchive	449	347 (77.3%)	255 (73.5%)	83 (23.9%)	9 (2.6%)	112	40 (35.7%)	27 (67.5%)	13 (32.5%)
thttpd	31	26 (83.9%)	19 (73.1%)	7 (26.9%)	0 (0.0%)	127	96 (75.6%)	61 (63.5%)	35 (36.5%)
tinybignum	2	2 (100.0%)	2 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	13	13 (100.0%)	13 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	1,024	792 (77.3%)	570 (72.0%)	207 (26.1%)	15 (1.9%)	727	428 (58.9%)	344 (47.3%)	84 (11.6%)


Evaluation: Effectiveness of Interactive Conversion

Program	Step	Source Changes (LOC)		Pointers				Root Causes	
		Manual	3C	ptr	arr	ntarr	wild	Num	Avg
vsftpd	3c (Initial)	-	1760	1220	46	98	441	304	21.4
	Phase 1	367	1616	1261	82	179	290	224	4.5
	Phase 2		1889	1407	177	240	97	96	1.2
thttpd	3c (Initial)	-	704	338	57	236	198	136	29.6
	Phase 1	708	771	392	75	348	58	53	1.9
	Phase 2		1450	398	87	468	15	25	1.6
icecast	3c (Initial)	-	2102	1424	54	312	887	1142	51.2
	Phase 1	168	5529	1667	62	330	636	874	37.0
	Phase 2		2592	1829	70	523	328	266	4.0

Mostly Annotations

Conclusion

Actively Maintained: <https://3clsp.github.io/>




Contact:

Aravind Machiry (amachiry@purdue.edu)

Michael Hicks (mwh@cs.umd.edu)

Memory Safety is a Problem (Still!?)



Stack corruptions are essentially dead

Use after free spiked in 2013-2015 due to web browser UAF, but was mitigated by Mem GC


Heap out-of-bounds read, type confusion, & uninitialized use have generally increased

Spatial safety remains the most common vulnerability category (heap out-of-bounds read/write)

kind graph


```
1: int *foo(int *x) {  
2: ...  
3: return x;  
4: }
```

```
5: bar () {  
6: int *i, *j, *k;  
7: i = (int *)0xff86763;  
8: j = foo(i);  
9: k = i;  
10: j[0] = ...  
}
```



ptype graph



```
1: int *foo(int *x) {  
2: ...  
3: return x;  
4: }  
  
5: bar () {  
6: int *i, *j, *k;  
7: i = (int *)0xff86763;  
8: j = foo(i);  
9: k = i;  
10: j[0] = ...  
}
```



kind and ptype graph

```
1: int *foo(int *x) {  
2: ...  
3: return x;  
4: }
```

```
5: bar () {  
6: int *i, *j, *k;  
7: i = (int *)0xff86763;  
8: j = foo(i);  
9: k = i;  
10: j[0] = ...  
}
```




Rewrite Based on the Final Solution

```
array_ptr<int> *foo(array_ptr<int> x) {  
    ...  
    return x;  
}
```

```
bar () {  
    int *i, *k;  
    array_ptr<int> j = NULL;  
    i = (int *)0xff86763;  
    j = foo(i);  
    k = i;  
    j[0] = ...  
}
```

Final Solution



Our Approach


- Automated Conversion of C to Checked C.
 - Infer Checked types for Pointers.
 - Rewrite corresponding pointers with Checked types.

Type qualifier inference

Step 2: Create **constraints** based on pointer usage.

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
  int *r; r
  int *m; m
  ...
  m = r;
  ...
  if (p[i])
    ...
  return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
  int *x; x
  int **y; y_1 y_2
  ...
  x = foo(y);
  ...
  x[i] = 0;
}
```




Type qualifier inference

Step 2: Create **constraints** based on pointer usage.

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
  int *r; r
  int *m; m
  ...
  m = r;
  ...
  if (p[i])
    ...
  return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
  int *x; x
  int **y; y_1 y_2
  ...
  x = foo(y);
  ...
  x[i] = 0;
}
```




Type qualifier inference

Step 2: Create **constraints** based on pointer usage.

```
ret_f
int *foo(int **p) {
  int *r; r
  int *m; m
  ...
  m = r;
  ...
  if (p[i])
    ...
  return r;
}
```

```
bar() {
  int *x; x
  int **y; y_1 y_2
  ...
  x = foo(y);
  ...
  x[i] = 0;
}
```




Rewrite Based on the Final Solution

```
int *foo(int *x) {  
    ...  
    return x;  
}
```

```
bar () {  
    int *i, *j, *k;  
    i = (int *)0xff86763;  
    j = foo(i);  
    k = i;  
    j[0] = ...  
}
```

Final Solution



bar

foo

Rewrite Based on the Final Solution

```
int *foo(int *x) {  
    ...  
    return x;  
}
```

```
bar () {  
    int *i, *j, *k;  
    i = (int *)0xff86763;  
    j = foo(i);  
    k = i;  
    j[0] = ...  
}
```





```
array_ptr<int> *foo(array_ptr<int>  
x) {  
    ...  
    return x;  
}
```

```
bar () {  
    int *i, *k;  
    array_ptr<int> j = NULL;  
    i = (int *)0xff86763;  
    j = foo(i);  
    k = i;  
    j[0] = ...  
}
```


Rewrite Based on the Final Solution

```
array_ptr<int> *foo(array_ptr<int> x) {  
    ...  
    return x;  
}
```

```
bar () {  
    int *i, *k;  
    array_ptr<int> j = NULL;  
    i = (int *)0xff86763;  
    j = foo(assume_bounds_cast<array_ptr>(i, unknown));  
    k = i;  
    j[0] = ...  
}
```

- Passing WILD arguments to checked parameters:
 - use `assume_bounds_cast`. 
- If passing checked arguments to WILD parameters:
 - Use `itype`. 

Bounds-safe Interface for backward compatibility

```
char *strncpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len);
```

```
void foo() {  
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);  
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);  
  ...  
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5);  
  ...  
}
```

error: Passing `_Array_ptr<char>` to parameter of incompatible type `char*`.

Bounds-safe Interface for backward compatibility

```
char *strncpy(_Array_ptr<char> dst : count(n),  
             _Array_ptr<const char> src : count(n), size_t n);
```

```
void foo() {  
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);  
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);  
  ...  
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5); This is Okay.  
  ...  
}
```

Bounds-safe Interface for backward compatibility

```
char *strncpy(_Array_ptr<char> dst : count(n),  
             _Array_ptr<const char> src : count(n), size_t n);
```

```
void foo() {  
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);  
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);  
  ...  
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5); This is Okay.  
  ...  
}
```

What about calling from unchecked code?

```
void bar() {  
  char *s1 = malloc(10);  
  char *s2 = malloc(5);  
  ...  
  strncpy(s1, s2, 5);  
  ...  
}
```

Bounds-safe Interface for backward compatibility

```
char *strncpy(_Array_ptr<char> dst : count(n),
              _Array_ptr<const char> src : count(n), size_t n);
```

```
void foo() {
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);
  ...
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5); This is Okay.
  ...
}
```

What about calling from unchecked code?

```
void bar() {
  char *s1 = malloc(10);
  char *s2 = malloc(5);
```

```
  strncpy(s1, s2, 5); → error: argument has unknown bounds, bounds expected because the 1st parameter has bounds.
  ...
}
```

Bounds-safe Interface for backward compatibility

```
char *strncpy(_Array_ptr<char> dst : count(n),
              _Array_ptr<const char> src : count(n), size_t n);
```

```
void foo() {
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);
  ...
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5); This is Okay.
  ...
}
```

What about calling from unchecked code?

```
void bar() {
  char *s1 = malloc(10);
  char *s2 = malloc(5);
```

```
  strncpy(s1, s2, 5); error: argument has unknown bounds, bounds expected because the 1st parameter has bounds.
  ...
}
```

Can we have a mechanism working for both checked and unchecked code?

Yes, by bounds-safe interface.

Bounds-safe Interface for strncpy()

```
char *strncpy(char *dst : itype(_Array_ptr<char>) byte_count(n),  
              const char *src : itype(_Array_ptr<const char>) byte_count(n),  
              size_t n) : itype(_Array_ptr<T>) byte_count(n);
```

itype (interoperation type): a special type that can be either checked or unchecked type, depending on the context.

- ⦿ dst is set to an **itype** with bounds of n bytes
- ⦿ src is set to an **itype** with bounds of n bytes
- ⦿ return value is set to an **itype** with bounds of n bytes

Bounds-safe Interface for strncpy()

```
char *strncpy(char *dst : itype(_Array_ptr<char>) byte_count(n),
              const char *src : itype(_Array_ptr<const char>) byte_count(n),
              size_t n) : itype(_Array_ptr<T>) byte_count(n);
```

itype (interoperation type): a special type that can be either checked or unchecked type, depending on the context.

- ⦿ dst is set to an **itype** with bounds of n bytes
- ⦿ src is set to an **itype** with bounds of n bytes
- ⦿ return value is set to an **itype** with bounds of n bytes

```
void bar() {
  char *s1 = malloc(10);
  char *s2 = malloc(5);
```

```
  strncpy(s1, s2, 5); Can compile and run without any bounds check.
```


Bounds-safe Interface for strncpy()

```
char *strncpy(char *dst : itype(_Array_ptr<char>) byte_count(n),  
              const char *src : itype(_Array_ptr<const char>) byte_count(n),  
              size_t n) : itype(_Array_ptr<T>) byte_count(n);
```

```
void foo() {  
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);  
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);  
  ...  
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5);  
  ...  
}
```

Bounds-safe Interface for strncpy()

```
char *strncpy(char *dst : itype(_Array_ptr<char>) byte_count(n),  
              const char *src : itype(_Array_ptr<const char>) byte_count(n),  
              size_t n) : itype(_Array_ptr<T>) byte_count(n);
```

```
void foo() {  
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);  
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);  
  ...  
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5); → S1 and S2 are bounds checked at the call-site.  
  ...  
}
```

Bounds-safe Interface for strncpy()

```
char *strncpy(char *dst : itype(_Array_ptr<char>) byte_count(n),
              const char *src : itype(_Array_ptr<const char>) byte_count(n),
              size_t n) : itype(_Array_ptr<T>) byte_count(n);
```

```
void foo() {
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);
  ...
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5); → S1 and S2 are bounds checked at the call-site.
  ...
}
```

```
strncpy(s1, s2, 6);
```

Bounds-safe Interface for strncpy()

```
char *strncpy(char *dst : itype(_Array_ptr<char>) byte_count(n),  
             const char *src : itype(_Array_ptr<const char>) byte_count(n),  
             size_t n) : itype(_Array_ptr<T>) byte_count(n);
```

```
void foo() {  
  _Array_ptr<char> s1 : count(10) = malloc<char>(10);  
  _Array_ptr<char> s2 : count(5) = malloc<char>(5);  
  ...  
  dst = strncpy(s1, s2, 5); → S1 and S2 are bounds checked at the call-site.  
  ...  
}
```

`strncpy(s1, s2, 6);` **→ error: argument does not meet declared bounds for the 2nd parameter.**

_Nt_array_ptr<T>

Points to a null-terminated array of type T (integral and pointer type)
— permits pointer arithmetic

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p0 : count(5) = "12345";` OK. `p0` is pointing to array of 6 chars (including NULL).

_Nt_array_ptr<T>

Points to a null-terminated array of type T (integral and pointer type)
— permits pointer arithmetic

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p0 : count(5) = "12345";` **OK. p0 is pointing to array of 6 chars (including NULL).**

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p = "12345";` **Equivalent to declaring Bounds of p as "p: bounds(p, p+1)"**

_Nt_array_ptr<T>

Points to a null-terminated array of type T (integral and pointer type)
— permits pointer arithmetic

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p0 : count(5) = "12345";` **OK. p0 is pointing to array of 6 chars (including NULL).**

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p = "12345";` **Equivalent to declaring Bounds of p as "p: bounds(p, p+1)"**

`char c = p[0];` **OK.**

_Nt_array_ptr<T>

Points to a null-terminated array of type T (integral and pointer type)
— permits pointer arithmetic

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p0 : count(5) = "12345";` **OK. p0 is pointing to array of 6 chars (including NULL).**

`_Nt_array_ptr<char> p = "12345";` **Equivalent to declaring Bounds of p as "p: bounds(p, p+1)"**

`char c = p[0];` **OK.**

`char c = p[1];` **error: out-of-bounds access.**

`= p[1];`
~~~~~